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Conversing with Some 
Chickadees: Cautious Acts of 
Ontological Translation
Amba J. Sepie
Some old-timers, men who became famous for their powers and 
skills, had been great dreamers. Hunters and dreamers. They did not 
hunt as most people do now. They did not seek uncertainly for the 
trails of animals whose movements we can only guess at. No, they 
located their prey in dreams, found their trails, and made dream-
kills. Then, the next day, or a few days later, whenever it seemed 
auspicious to do so, they could go out, find the trail, re-encounter 
the animal, and collect the kill.
—Hugh Brody, Maps and Dreams: Indians 
and the British Colombia Frontier, 19811 
The Chickadee-person is a good listener. Nothing escapes his ears, 
which he has sharpened by constant use. Whenever others are talking 
together of their successes, there you will find the Chickadee-person 
listening to their words.” Becoming a chickadee, then, is a virtue—
a form of human excellence . . . “The chickadee is big medicine,” 
Pretty-Shield told her interviewer.
—Jonathan Lear, Radical Hope: Ethics in 
the Face of Cultural Devastation, 20062
During the 1970s, when Hugh Brody was recording descriptions 
of dreamhunting practices among the Beaver Indians in the Northwest-
ern territories of Canada, it seemed reasonable that, within a relatively 
short time, academics would catch up with the social changes wrought 
during the revolutionary decade of the 1960s.3 Working anthropologists 
such as Brody and newly emerging indigenous academics such as Vine 
Deloria, Jr. were presenting radical scholarship with the assumption that 
many cultural, gendered, sexual, political, religious, and geographical 
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inequalities would eventually be overcome and a common sense rec-
ognition of the legitimacy of other worldviews would emerge. 
Unfortunately, that didn’t happen. Indigenous academics working 
on behalf of their own peoples around the globe are still striving for 
recognition within a climate of limited and partisan hospitality, and 
only in the wake of blows delivered by a long line of feminist, black, 
indigenous, and pedagogical scholars.4 Part of the issue is that the 
radical alterity posited by people such as dreamhunters, spirit talkers, 
and others claims a place for the existence of an other-than-human 
reality which is as fully valid as Western ways of thinking, being, 
and doing. Not only this, but the stories (and the demand that they 
be heard) are told and re-told to ethnographers who are then chal-
lenged with the task of finding how and where these radical breaks 
with accepted “rationality” might be accommodated within an often 
selective and exclusive academic discipline.
Brody’s predecessor, Frank Bird Linderman (more a cowboy and 
native enthusiast with a talent for writing than a trained anthropolo-
gist), went to the Crow Nation, among other groups, in the early 
twentieth century to gather “quaint” autobiographical folktales and 
origin stories told by Native informants from what was thought to 
be a disappearing culture.5 Linderman is best known for his work on 
Plenty Coups and Pretty-shield: Medicine Woman of the Crows.6 Pretty-shield 
was an elderly woman he interviewed in the 1920s; the latter book 
was illustrated and perhaps meant for children, as it was dedicated 
to his granddaughter.7 In it Linderman records anecdotes, moments 
from Pretty-Shield’s childhood, and stories in which she effortlessly 
blends the more regular aspects of daily life with interludes where 
people not only speak with animals but are sometimes so intertwined 
with them that they are “chickadee-persons” or “woman-mice.” Pretty-
shield is very aware of the contradictions between her worldview and 
Linderman’s; Linderman quotes her as saying “reproachfully,” “‘Ahhh, 
you have written down my words. . . . If you put them in a book 
nobody who can read will believe them; and yet they only tell the 
truth.’”8 Truth for Pretty-shield and truth for Frank Linderman, how-
ever, are words with very different meanings and cultural contexts. For 
Pretty-shield, to know it happened is enough, as the relation between 
knowledge and the integrity of that knowledge is codified within her 
Crow worldview in a manner she clearly recognizes as foreign to 
Linderman. Brian Swann, writing on incommensurable worldviews and 
translation, notes: “What Westerners regard as ‘myth,’ which carries 
a sense of ‘fabrication,’ a traditional native person might regard as a 
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true account. . . . The translator needs to draw on many resources to 
present such a universe convincingly.”9
This essay explores the challenges and the promise offered by 
the task of translation between Euroamerican and Native cosmolo-
gies, ontologies, and worldviews. It traces how insufficient hospitality 
toward Native cultures and a failure to examine the cosmological pre-
suppositions of the white, Western, secular academy have resulted in 
the obfuscation or denigration of Native ways of being and knowing. 
Attempts to assimilate Native knowledge into Euroamerican concepts 
of religion, medicine, or culture have fallen short precisely because of 
the incommensurability of Western disciplinary formations with Native 
worldviews—worldviews that do not privilege subject-object relations or 
linear views of time. What is more, the very languages through which 
Native storytellers and Euroamerican scholars approach one another 
are freighted with assumptions about the validity of narrative and 
what makes an utterance “true.” Since Native ways of being are often 
expressed through story, Western scholars must interrogate their own 
assumptions about narrative and adopt, explicitly and self-consciously, 
a model of scholarship that embraces translation at the level not only 
of speech but also of ontology.
Debating the legitimacy of indigenous ways of knowing is quite 
a different endeavor than deciding they are legitimate a priori and then 
figuring out how they relate, or don’t, to modern Western ways of 
thinking about the world. It is the latter task that remains urgent, in 
accordance with Sami scholar Rauna Kuokkanen’s ethic of hospitality, 
which requires a commitment to responsibility and openness toward 
the “other.” Her argument is that the Academy “cannot grasp or 
even hear views that are grounded in other epistemic [knowledge] 
conventions.”10 Furthermore, “Many indigenous people contend that 
notwithstanding its rhetoric of welcome and hospitality, the academy 
is not a good host . . . with only a weak commitment to indigenous 
people.”11 Her proposal is that scholars move beyond deliberating the 
terms of legitimacy, via comparisons between standards of truth, and 
instead innovate different philosophical and practical methodologies 
for regarding indigenous ways of seeing as intellectually and socially 
valuable. The argument here is that the form of hospitality she is call-
ing for requires a deeper kind of cosmological interrogation by scholars; 
that is, a self-reflexive endeavor or inquiry into key charter myths 
and classificatory systems that makes translation between different 
worldviews possible.
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With this in mind, the method suggested in this essay involves 
multiple reflections on translation. Cultural translation is the translation 
of a worldview into a narrative that can be understood outside of a 
specific cultural context. If the story of Pretty-shield, which is nearing 
one hundred years old, is considered together with Kuokkanen’s urgent 
request for hospitality, it becomes evident just how far scholarship has, 
or has not, progressed in the interim. 
Ethnographies are stories about people which are true—but “true” 
only insomuch as the sources and recorders are considered reliable 
according to particular truth standards. Indeed, the very discipline 
charged with the task of understanding the “other” appears to be 
short on the means to intellectually incorporate what scholars find in 
the field, and is further afflicted with a dubious history of romanti-
cism, exoticism, and Eurocentrism. As Christine Colasurdo writes, 
“Scholars today generally accept the fact that early Euro-American 
anthropologists, trained in a fledgling discipline, carried out to the 
field a suitcase full of cultural biases.”12 That recognition does not 
automatically grant non-Euroamerican anthropologists prominence in 
the discipline, however. It is still too easy to ignore scholars who are 
themselves at the margins, studying people at the margins who hold 
marginalized ideas: to dismiss ethnographers or selective parts of an 
account as simply “what people believe.” 
Indeed, academic ways of knowing have proved very capable of 
reducing complex cultural realities and experiences into tidy accounts 
of knowledge. These accounts are organized most often as sub-areas 
of the larger categories of “religion” or “culture.” For instance, tradi-
tionally, from the perspective of Euroamerican scholars, when animals 
speak or when old men dream a kill, the narratives told have been 
classified as fable, fiction, myth, story, or folktale.13 Folklorists work-
ing on the edges of academic respectability have collected such stories 
like treasures or relics; over time their findings have been classified as 
“narrative” and thereby as unreliable content, from unreliable sources, 
recorded by unreliable scholars. Such stories appear in anthropology 
merely as context for “hard” data, and are truly analyzed only in liter-
ary or religious studies. (This last arrangement is unfortunate, for as 
Sam Gill points out, “The academic study of religion . . . is academic; 
it is Western; it is intellectual.”14) 
“Culture” fares no better than religion in that it is a multi-layered 
point of reference that academics often only gesture toward. The term 
and concept of “religion” in particular seems to have become a clear-
inghouse for anything “non-scientific,” including all things invisible 
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or those which involve powers or forces falling within the catchment 
of “culture.”
Culture and religion are Euroamerican terms that do not hospitably 
relate indigenous lived realities, and are in fact often incommensurate 
with indigenous worldviews. They do not, for example, resolve the is-
sues presented by diverse cosmologies; any claim for beings or entities 
embedded within local landscapes are automatically relegated, from 
this standpoint, to the category of “having a religion.” However, as 
Jace Weaver writes, “Traditional Native religions are integrated totally 
into daily activity. They are ways of life and not sets of principles 
or credal formulations.”15 The concept of a religious “other” is well-
suited to the purposes of maintaining relations of power inherited 
from colonialism; both religion and culture remain part of a larger 
reference set from a single, dominant intellectual tradition which con-
tinues to reinforce these relations. Colin Scott states that, “we may be 
largely unconscious of the metaphysical paradigms that underlie our 
own understandings of the world, while those of other knowledge 
traditions strike us as exotic, improbable, even ‘superstitious.’”16 If, 
in colloquial terms, knowledge is power—a commonly expressed but 
significant axiom in contemporary society—then what is required is a 
recognition of the metaphysical scaffolding that supports and sustains 
the knowledge-value relationships influencing how Native understand-
ings of the world are read.
Multiple Versions of the World(s):  
Indigenous Metaphysics and Meanings
To privilege a certain metaphysical understanding regarding 
the nature of humans, the world, experiences, and so forth, whether 
Christian, Western, Native, or Other, is to consider ontology, the study 
of what can exist, or what can possibly exist. Ontologies are gener-
ally unthought: we all have categories of being, or things we accept 
as existent in the world, but only dwell rarely on what these might 
be. Notions such as “fact,” “truth,” and “value” are derived from 
ontologies, however, so the analysis of ontological constructs within 
any cultural complex is very important. 
Ontology is constituted from whatever cosmological tenets, origin 
stories, or charter myths guide a community; these demarcate not 
only what can happen and what can be, but also what is possible, 
what is reasonable, and what is rational. All of these, in turn, affect 
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behaviors, practices, norms, and the “action” of culture. For instance, 
under a Christian cosmology there can be no “unbound” spirits in 
the world—they cannot exist. The Christian cosmological framework 
is tightly controlled: spirits are either bound in human form or are 
“with God.” Conversely, in a secular scientific naturalist framework, 
all things in the world are ultimately materialistic in nature—there is 
nothing “spiritual” to be controlled. According to this cosmology, no 
unbridled spirits can exist or are possible, therefore they cannot be 
studied. As both cosmologies inform very directly what is possible, 
they are the primary determinants of their respective ontologies. What 
can be known (epistemology) and what has value (axiology) can be 
added to these concepts in order to map out a worldview.
The language that is representative of, or translates, a worldview 
is emergent from the relationships between these different philosophi-
cal areas. Language, both in how it originates (its etymology) and 
in how it is used, is as much a part of a worldview as any other 
cultural element, for the precise reason that it communicates ideas 
in local ways, with local inflections regarding meaning. Consider, for 
instance, the concept of medicine: on the surface, this single word 
serves to represent Native American and Euroamerican medicine as if 
they were the same entity. However, as F. David Peat asks, “just what 
is ‘medicine’ in Native context? A medicine person may refer to the 
herbs and plants in her bag as being medicine, but Native Americans 
will also say that a ceremony they attended, an experience they had, 
or the food they are eating is ‘good medicine.’”17 
If what can be known about something (epistemology) is defined 
according to the limits of the guiding ontology—as designated by the 
overarching cosmological framework—and yet the words being used 
are mapped to different cosmological frameworks, then we must seek 
accommodations for representing different concepts with local referents. 
Any radical differences which can be identified at a cosmological-
ontological level must be reconciled or interrogated further. This is the 
work of translation, which strives to relay and relate the ways of being 
of different peoples in the world without reducing them to a set of 
beliefs. It is achieved by being aware of and interrogating one’s own 
ontology simultaneously with that of the “other”—an effort too often 
hampered by the cosmological precept within Euroamerican thinking 
that ontological differences must be categorized as beliefs.
Religion and culture, like medicine, are problematic terms in 
that they are colloquially distributed as universals with multiple refer-
ences, and yet are infused implicitly with post-Christian, Euroamerican 
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academic and popular baggage. Peat notes that a Native concept of 
medicine stretches the Western paradigm to its limit: as Christianity and 
science both reject the benevolent efficacy of spirits, the spirit quality 
of Native medicine becomes an untranslatable concept in any idiom 
that has internalized the ontological premises of Christianity. Spirits 
do not exist in the Euroamerican framework without also possessing 
the potential for dangerous acts.18 Add to this the fact that the very 
processes of Christianization have also “involved some internalization 
of the larger illusion of Indian inferiority and the idealization of white 
culture and religion” and translation between worldviews becomes quite 
challenging, as many experts in translation between languages attest.19 
To translate between worldviews, or cosmological translation, is to find 
appropriate references which can carry meaning from one way of be-
ing in the world to another, without substantial loss of context—just 
as with language translation.20
To suggest that ontologies are singularly held, or exist in a bi-
narized sense (such as Christian versus Native ways of being), would 
be an error: radically incommensurable worldviews can be held by 
a single individual simultaneously. This is sometimes called holding 
plural contradictory commitments. All modern people are raised with 
multiple versions of the world from which some approximation or 
negotiation of ideas, beliefs, and values is generally formed through 
socialization. All perspectives must bridge multiple worlds, as modern 
individuals are not raised monoculturally; nor does anyone inhabit a 
reality in which the realms of experience are neatly categorized into 
spheres such as religion, medicine, or culture. The key point here is 
that many indigenous worldviews are explicitly interconnected, and 
do not accord with the notion of distinct and bounded entities. This 
ontological formation is somewhat separate from how minds and 
worlds and persons are sometimes thought, and it must be held along-
side the notion of individuality. A non-bounded worldview, similar to 
a non-bounded person or a non-bounded concept of culture, makes 
translation into a worldview replete with bounded entities (such as a 
Euroamerican one) extremely challenging. 
Medicine, within this context, is not “just” religious or cultural 
knowledge, but neither is it the strict application of cure to illness. 
Within many indigenous worldviews, medicine is intertwined with an 
intuitive faculty, with the perception of the human being in a web of 
relations with community, nature, time, and the spirit of an individual 
as it “occurs” relative to, and within, these networks.21 Doreen Marti-
nez writes that a “social relations paradigm best encapsulates the way 
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Native Americans understand health, healing and medicine. . . . This 
paradigm involves an interconnection between building, maintaining 
and sustaining relationships, not just regarding health, but as an entire 
way of life in which healing is embedded.”22 This involves being alert 
to possibilities for information or communication that may happen 
during relations with people, things, dreams, and via intuitive facul-
ties; these may take the form of warnings, advice, admonishments, 
or predictions. Since practices which might be economic, political, or 
ritual in nature are the activities of people in relationships with one 
another, other living species, and the cosmological order, medicine is 
whatever will mediate the health of these relationships. 
Medicine, then, is one of the realms of human experience in 
which a more nuanced translation becomes most essential. Peat explains 
how differences in translation between two radically different kinds 
of medicine—Western and Native—might be understood: whereas the 
emphasis in English (and most other European languages of the same 
family) is on the noun, the emphasis in most indigenous languages 
is on the verb; thus, “when in English we speak of ‘medicine’ we 
automatically seek a referent, a substance, an object, something tan-
gible, something that can be conceptualized. But suppose we begin 
with something verbal, with activity, process, [or] movement.”23 The 
boundaries that apply to persons-as-subjects, including the boundaries 
generally ascribed to temporal and spatial locations, and the move-
ment of information across these boundaries, are profoundly altered 
by shifting to a verb-based map for communication in which boundar-
ies are less tightly controlled. In real terms, this means that persons 
and objects exist as “things” only within a particular context, with a 
shifting metaphysical status and named only in accordance with that 
context. It is the action or state (flowing, speaking, angry), and not 
the noun (river), which determines identity.
According to this rubric, personhood is also rendered differently, 
reflecting the concept that in many indigenous contexts health is not 
transacted just between human individuals. For the Euroamerican in-
dividual (including indigenous persons enculturated with Euroamerican 
thinking), the residues of the Cartesian split, the species divide, and 
the long-reaching influences of Christian tripartite dogma cut people 
off from one another and the environment. The modern “person” is 
isolated, inhabiting a very private space of the mind and self that has 
been sometimes characterized as egocentric, differentiated, bounded, and 
autonomous.24 “So embedded are the Cartesian myths of the dualities of 
mind-body, culture-nature,” Colin Scott writes, “that we tend to privilege 
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models of physical causality, rather than relations of consciousness and 
significance, in our perception even of sentient nature.”25 Conversely, 
the Cree, for example, “assume common connections among people, 
animals, and other entities while exploring the nature of their differ-
ences. . . . In Cree, there is no word corresponding to our term ‘nature.’ 
There is a word pimaatisiiwin (life), which includes human as well as 
animal ‘persons.’ The word for ‘person,’ iiyiyuu, can be glossed as ‘he 
lives.’ Humans, animals, spirits, and several geophysical agents are 
perceived to have qualities of personhood.”26 For Cree, as with many 
indigenous communities, kinship between what are commonly referred 
to as “all our relations” is thought of as symmetrical and reciprocal 
and is not generally based on bounded distinctions between people, 
animals, objects, or elements of the natural world.27 
As A. Irving Hallowell writes of Native (in this case Ojibwa) 
worldviews, “In outward manifestation neither animal nor human 
characteristics define categorical differences in the core of being.”28 
Talking of stones, he explains that the Ojibwa 
are not animists in the sense that they dogmatically attribute liv-
ing souls to inanimate objects . . . [but] the allocation of stones to 
an animate grammatical category is part of a culturally constituted 
cognitive “set.” It does not involve a consciously formulated theory 
about the nature of stones. Whereas Euroamericans should never 
expect a stone to manifest animate properties of any kind under 
any circumstances, the Ojibwa recognize a priori potentialities for 
animation in certain classes of objects under certain circumstances.29
Who, or what, is speaking is very significant in terms of the rela-
tions between the speaker and listener, but the category of “things” 
to which the speaker belongs is not: an animal, other human, ances-
tor, manifestation of weather, or supernatural agent might necessarily 
become a member of any category outside of a typical subject-object 
or person-nonperson relation. A human is not necessarily always the 
only person who speaks or has agency, wisdom, medicine, and so forth. 
It is important to keep in mind that the essential difference in 
cosmologies that attributes personhood and even deification to wise 
speaking animals or natural forces sets the conditions of possibility in 
the Cree ontological schema: what is possible is traceable to the origin 
myths, just as it is for modern Euroamericans. In Canada, as Donald 
Fixico writes, “The primal relationship between humans and animals 
dates back to mythical times when both were new members of a 
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created world. . . . [S]tories about man’s relationship with the animal 
world developed into . . . stories [that] carried forward an oral histori-
cal tradition.”30 A possible “entity” may therefore be a speaking bird, 
or similar, which appears as a source of knowledge (and therefore is 
epistemologically important), whilst axiologically, the value attributed 
to this entity is derived from an origin myth. An angel speaking to 
a Christian believer in a dream, or a scientist confirming the chaotic 
(or synchronistic) nature of the universe in his daily drive to work are 
perhaps not so dissimilar: in each case, cosmological tenets reinforce the 
validity of experience, and experience, in turn, reinforces the cosmology.
Such thought experiments as comparing the Christian and the 
scientist—which may be the same person—can be exercises in cosmo-
logical interrogation, which requires self-reflexivity when evaluating the 
truth claims of other peoples relative to one’s own. Indeed, the logic 
of indigenous ways of thinking and seeing the world becomes more 
comprehensible when they are engaged with openly and comparatively 
(rather than with mere tolerance or the suspension of disbelief); when 
they are approached, in short, as a conversation between cosmologies, 
in which differences are made explicit and investigated. The rule of 
thumb here is to challenge (in very personal terms) any immediate 
doubt, suspicion, or rejection of what is encountered with a series 
of questions meant to disclose the basis upon which the rejection is 
founded—to try to uncover the point at which a key cosmological 
difference is making translation difficult.31 Clearly a degree of self-
understanding and a willingness to overcome cognitive dissonance 
must be a part of this “self-help for scholars” process, but this is what 
hospitality requires. Basic translation difficulties might arise, as they do 
with literature, but the goal must be to expand the host ontology to 
accommodate the “other” perspective, rather than reduce that perspec-
tive to Euroamerican understandings, in pursuit of a more nuanced, 
hospitable, balanced, and ultimately respectful translation. 
Take historical events, for example. Writing of Navajo ontology, 
Vincent Crapanzano identifies the language as grammatically proces-
sual and dynamic, creating a narrated landscape of interactions which 
is at once both local and highly abstract: “Where English stresses the 
verb ‘to be,’ the Navajo stress the verb ‘to go’—naaghaii . . . which 
refers to continually going about and returning. . . . The active verbs 
[in Navajo] report events . . . movement, or movings . . . conceived 
very concretely in terms of the movements of corporeal bodies or of 
entities metaphorically attached to corporeal bodies.”32 By extension, 
then, anything that can be understood in English as concrete, such as 
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an historical event, has to be conceptually embedded—in Navajo, but 
also in other Native languages—in specific places. These events are 
anchored in such places through human witnesses, but also through 
nonhuman ones whose experience humans have access to. Ethnographer 
Keith Basso writes that the landscape acquires value and significance by 
virtue of socially transmitted systems of meanings which are compat-
ible with shared understandings of how speakers and listeners know 
themselves to occupy it. Places and objects generate their own fields 
of meaning which are information-rich, interpreted in relation-to, and 
recorded orally through story, ritual, and song. Language, time and 
space are therefore interconnected in a holistic and processual web of 
relationships, as opposed to a Euroamerican linear, or static, worldview 
that privileges subject-object distinctions. Put plainly, the relation be-
tween subject and object is not fixed, nor predefined, nor particularly 
obedient to the categories of subject and object. 
In any encounter with Native ethnographies, then—not just in 
Native American or First Nations contexts but with regard to many 
indigenous communities—translation has to occur conceptually, not just 
from one language to another, in order for the host ontology to ac-
commodate the new perspective. As soon as we write, think, or speak 
into English the content of an alternate worldview, we must become 
hyper-aware of what our casual terms of reference connote at the 
etymological level and, further, what must be accommodated when 
transferring foreign concepts into the host ontology. 
Of Speaking Birds: Pretty-Shield’s Stories and Chickadee Medicine
“Story,” within Native oral traditions, is the foundation of learning 
and the means of communicating all kinds of cultural experience. As 
in all oral traditions, the stories of Native American and First Nations 
peoples are active, and they serve a purpose. They are not simply pas-
sive oral libraries, nor are they fiction—they are medicine. As Brianna 
Burke writes, “Native scholars, writers, poets, and elders emphasize that 
language itself has a physical effect in the world, particularly prayers 
or ceremonies. Unlike postmodern theorists, who argue that the world 
and the thing it signifies are irremediably separated, many traditional 
Native views reflect the belief that words can make things happen.”33 In 
recording the tale of Pretty-shield, Frank Linderman’s challenge was 
to convey, with all seriousness, events that he may have personally 
thought to be impossible. Perhaps most difficult was reconciling two 
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kinds of truth: the ethnographer’s “fact” as it is represented in the 
text and codified as “non-fiction,” and the storyteller’s truth, which 
has a distinct fact-value of its own. 
Native stories can be “true” in that they are thought to possess 
metaphorical and anagogical meaning without being either literally true 
or fictional: conversely, there are also stories which did not happen and 
are not “true,” and these do conform to our notion of fiction.34 When 
stories are medicine, a story’s truth is relative to the perceived value 
or strength of the medicine it contains. What is considered fictional 
in Native oral traditions is more akin to what is not important or use-
ful according to Native ontological conceptions and value structures; 
and of course there is a wealth of modern Native literature which is 
considered fiction. Particular kinds of experiences, however, and the 
life lessons or larger philosophical points for consideration that are 
transmitted from generation to generation, ordinarily take the form 
of “true” stories. 
Consider Native American and feminist scholar Paula Gunn Allen’s 
account of Linderman’s interactions with Pretty-shield, as recounted in 
her book Grandmothers of the Light.35 As Allen describes it, Pretty-shield 
calls the chickadee “big medicine,” and tells Linderman a tale from her 
childhood in which her grandmother educates her in the ways of the 
non-physical world; a fitting introduction to Pretty-shield’s future role 
as a medicine woman.36 The chickadees in her stories not only converse 
with the child and her grandmother but issue warnings of danger 
and make predictions which come to pass.37 Pretty-shield challenges 
Linderman directly on this point, calling him “Sign-talker,” the name 
bestowed upon him by the Crow: “‘Did the animal-people ever talk 
to you Sign-talker?’. . . When I told her that I had often understood 
what my horse or my dog wished me to know, she did not appear to 
be satisfied. . . . ‘But they do talk,’ she said firmly, half to herself.”38 
Whilst Linderman appears to engage with Pretty-shield on her 
own terms, and thinks carefully about her question, Allen points out 
that those raised in a “rationalist” world generally have no room for 
these explanations of such things; they are commonly thought of as the 
products of overactive imaginations or mass hysteria.39 “Yet traditional 
people insist that conversations with animals or supernaturals—little 
people, giants, immortals or holy people—are actual,” as Allen writes. 
“To them the world Pretty-Shield describes is the ordinary, the real 
world. . . . What are called ‘myths’ in the white world, and thought 
of as primitive spiritual stories that articulate psychological realities, are 
in the native world the accounts of actual interchanges. Pretty-shield is 
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not indirectly articulating hidden and disowned psychological drives. 
She is telling about actual conversations with some chickadees.”40 
Herein lies the disjunction between two distinct sets of cosmological 
tenets, the holistic (Native) view and the rationalist (Euroamerican) view, 
which separates Pretty-shield’s accounting of events from subsequent 
interpretations of it. The medicine contained within Pretty-shield’s story, 
and the opportunity it presents to the listener, is easily obscured as 
it becomes a matter of record, transmitted and altered by the filters 
of the ethnologist’s worldview. The result is a potentially serious loss 
of translative power, in both the literary sense common to translation 
studies and in the cosmo-ontological sense already outlined.41 This is 
not to suggest that Linderman somehow corrupted Pretty-shield’s nar-
rative, but to make the point that his authorship, and specifically the 
mediation of Pretty-shield’s oral stories through writing and (academic) 
narrative form, is likely to be incongruent with the Native worldview 
he wishes to capture and represent. A more extreme view might be 
that he cannot capture it wholly, that every reading of another world-
view or culture is necessarily partial, fragmented, and context-specific.
For many who are schooled and socialized in English-dominant, 
noun-dominant environments, and for whom conversations with other 
animals are ontologically impossible, stories like Pretty-Shield’s may be 
interpreted a priori as myth, fiction, or folktale. Deloria notes that “We 
are taught to believe from the beginning that animals have no feeling, 
emotion, or intellect. We assume they function by ‘instinct,’ but this 
word only covers up our ignorance of the capabilities of animals.”42 In 
his example, which relates conversations with a coyote, he is quick to 
point out that, despite the fact that this claim does not meet the philo-
sophical or scientific requirements of the Western world, the existence 
and validity of his conversation meets all the empirical requirements of 
the coyote world. Ethnographer Paul Nadasdy, in a similar vein, relates 
a Kluane First Nations view: “Indeed, I was told explicitly more than 
once that although animals in Kluane country probably cannot speak 
English, they most definitely can ‘speak Indian.’”43
Consider the dilemma to the Euroamerican upon learning that 
Pretty-shield’s great-great-grandmother, Seven Stars, is told her future 
by the chickadees: that she will have three sons but lose two of 
them and that she must never eat eggs.44 Is this health advice, life 
advice, or both? Furthermore, is such a thing even comprehensible to 
a Euroamerican ear? Or is it to be treated as a delusion, generating 
a mental note to watch the claimant for further signs of instability? 
Even when first-hand experience of an everyday occurrence, such as 
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the widely reported phenomenon of “mother’s intuition,” is useful or 
transformative, there is a significant collective ontological bias to over-
write experience with “common sense” assertions and denials. As Deloria 
writes, “The doctrinal exclusion of certain kinds of phenomena by the 
West has no basis except the superstition that certain things cannot 
exist.”45 Hospitality to other worldviews, therefore, begins with inter-
rogating our own cosmological, and thus ontological, presuppositions. 
Hospitality, or Why Truth Matters
Native ways of being are not necessarily bound by the spatial 
or temporal restrictions that Eurocentric discourses and expectations 
bring to them. As Deloria explains, “Our ancestors observed nature 
and perceived sets of relationships in the world. They used obscure 
correspondences to relate phenomena that appeared to be entirely 
separate and thereby derived a reasonably predictive knowledge about 
how the world works. Anomalies interested them and triggered their 
intuitional abilities.”46 Hospitality to various Native points of view 
requires an interest in anomalies, acceptance of the intuitive capacities 
of human beings, and recognition of the validity of other kinds of 
knowing or other ways of cosmologically rendering the natural world. 
Hospitality is part of the motivation for pursuing “good” or “better” 
translations of indigenous ways of being in the world whilst letting go 
of the Euroamerican insistence on rigorous classifications and binary 
thinking. Indeed, Kuokkanen, writing on hospitality, argues that the 
“silences” generated by scholarship that does not take into account 
certain metaphysical differences in worldview constitute a new kind 
of imperialism.47
Responsible movement towards not only accepting but under-
standing the radical alterity presented by Native ontologies, together 
with comprehensively exposing the ontological precepts generating 
Euroamerican culture, is critical to any sort of progress in this area. 
To make visible the ontology of Euroamerican thought and action is 
the responsibility of all scholars and citizens, not just the indigenous 
communities who have labored to translate and re-translate their onto-
logical differences from first contact forwards.48 Native American activist 
and scholar Barbara Cameron writes that it is not just up to her (and 
her people) to educate others about issues of race: “It is inappropriate 
for progressive or liberal white people to expect warriors in brown 
armor to eradicate racism. There must be co-responsibility from people 
of color and white people to equally work on this issue.”49 
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Making visible this ontology also means looking squarely at how 
liminal concepts are bound together in an illicit category of collected, 
yet marginalized, ways of being. Certain tropes which arise together 
with racial or ethnic difference, such as superstition, magic, paganism, 
madness, criminality, sexual difference, and danger, mutually reinforce 
each other and co-construct the interstitial spaces where poverty, sub-
stance abuse, and other problems are silently enabled and justified. To 
redress this injustice requires cosmological interrogation by individuals 
in relationship with indigenous peoples, but also that scholars within 
universities overcome long-standing self-imposed limitations on accept-
able kinds of scholarship. Such issues, and the debates surrounding 
them, have real-world impacts that continue the colonial project in 
the here and now.
In his work with the Innu of the Labrador-Quebec Peninsula in 
Canada, for instance, Colin Samson writes of the double bind facing 
people who live in “two worlds.”50 As with the challenges of modern-
ization faced by Pretty-shield and the Crow Nation a century ago, the 
Innu are in an impossible situation: the trajectory of progress imposed 
by the white man’s world competes with what it means to be Innu. 
The borrowings and adaptations made by the Innu (such as snowmo-
biles) are perceived as a “leap” forward into “successful” living that 
simultaneously makes them less “authentically indigenous.”51 Samson 
tells of how a “drunken young Innu man, after beckoning me up to 
his mother’s house, once told me several interconnected stories. . . . 
Waving his arms towards the window, he said that all the people we 
saw walking the beach road were Indians, those who live in houses, 
have jobs. . . . The Innu really only lived before 1950. To be an Innu 
was to be nomadic, to be a hunter.”52 He then recalled a story where 
he was on the beach, fixing leaks on a canoe, when he was approached 
by a man. “Tapping the outboard motor, the white man told him that 
this machinery was not Innu and that he would be dead without it. 
. . . [The white man’s] words paralyzed him. He suddenly felt that 
he couldn’t get up from the ground, as if he should sink into the 
sand.”53 Samson makes explicit that, by living under the “modes of 
persuasion and coercion” which amount to success in Euro-Canadian 
terms, Innu are vulnerable to the charge that they are no longer Innu, 
becoming white in all but outward appearance.54 
A fictional account of the violence that results from the unexam-
ined clash of worldviews can be found in the film Older Than America 
(2008), by Plains Cree director Georgina Lightning.55 Based loosely 
on her father’s life story and his experience of residential schools in 
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Canada, the story follows a group of contemporary Ojibwa who are 
coming to terms with the legacies of colonization. Lightning plays 
Rain, who like her mother before her suffers the reinterpretation of 
her own medicine—in this case her visions—as a mental illness re-
quiring intervention and shock therapy.56 The film throws psychiatry 
into sharp relief as a very effective instrument of control for enforc-
ing racial and religious superiority; it also comments critically on 
the ethnocidal impacts of the residential school system in Canada. 
These examples illustrate that it is not just hospitality that is urgent, 
but actual validation of radically different ways of seeing the world, 
even if that necessarily entertains the notion of other kinds of being, 
knowing, and doing. This is where hospitable academic practice could 
make a real-world difference. 
According to scholar and activist Taiaiake Alfred, “Challeng-
ing mainstream society to question its own structure, its acquisitive, 
individualistic value system and the false premises of colonialism is 
essential if we are to move beyond the problems plaguing all our 
societies, Native and white, and rebuild relations between our peoples. 
A deep reading of tradition points to a moral universe in which all 
of humanity is accountable to the same standard.”57 Urgent warnings 
of language death, for instance, are premised on this truth. Finally, for 
indigenous people the world over, there is simply too much confusion 
generated by an array of sources of cultural authority and competing 
moral codes, contributing to increased stigmatization, unprecedented 
rates of suicide, drug and alcohol abuse, and sexual abuse.58
Much of the time, academics consider questions about spirits, 
dreams, or the agency of chickadees, coyotes, and other animals, but 
go to great lengths to state that it “doesn’t matter” whether these sto-
ries are “true” or not, but only that they are accurate representations 
of “what people believe.”59 However, it must matter if the dominant 
worldview is to be properly queried in areas where it is hegemonic: 
in areas where ascriptions of cultural relativism simply cannot compete 
with the abiding authority of the dominant worldview. Truth matters in 
Euroamerican contexts, and to suggest it does not matter, or that truth 
is “relative” within an indigenous context, appears structurally racist. 
Real hospitality recognizes relations between cosmologies as key to 
understanding alterity. As Deloria writes, “You have got to look back 
into your own culture. . . . [W]hy, after Newton and Darwin, did you 
grab that one quadrant and say that is what the world is about?”60
If the people of the northwest coast of America say that salmon 
see each other as humans, salmon see humans as bears, and the leaves 
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on the bottom of the river are seen by humans as salmon, calling this 
a “claim” delegitimizes the entire worldview of a people.61 These are 
not “articles of faith” or quaint cultural beliefs.62 Stories and lifeways 
are medicine, and it is through them that worldviews remain salient; 
they are insurance against “losing the eyes,” a metaphor for the under-
standing and worldview embedded within the stories that are passed 
on through the generations.63 What is seen to be is multiplied through 
many eyes into what is—or as the late indigenous philosopher, Viola 
F. Cordova, sums up, how it is: “I exist only in and as a context. I 
am what that context has created. I did not burst full bloom into the 
world I confront.”64 My “stories” are not “myths,” Cordova insists.65 
They are a part of lived human experience that has legitimacy equiva-
lent with every other worldview.
The lived experience of an indigenous worldview exists as more 
than can be contained within any paradigm insistent upon contradic-
tion. It must be engaged with as an holistic and multisensory engage-
ment with the world as it is; as it appears in the moment. Hallowell 
quotes a beautiful anecdote that illustrates how we might understand 
a little better what Cordova is saying: “An informant told me that 
many years before he was sitting in a tent on a summer afternoon 
during a storm together with an old man and his wife. There was 
one clap of thunder after another. Suddenly, the old man turned to 
his wife and asked, ‘Did you hear what was said?’ ‘No,’ she replied, 
‘I didn’t catch it.’”66 
Other times, thunder is just thunder.
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